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ABSTRACT
The increasing usage of smart-phones and mobile devices in work environment and IT
industry has brought about unique set of challenges and opportunities. ARM architecture
in particular has evolved to a point where it supports implementations across wide spectrum
of performance points and ARM based tablets and smart-phones are in demand. The
enhancements to basic ARM RISC architecture allow ARM to have high performance,
small code size, low power consumption and small silicon area. Users want their devices to
perform many tasks such as read email, play games, and run other online applications and
organizations no longer desire to provision and maintain individual’s IT equipment. The
term BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) has come into being from demand of such a work
setup and is one of the motivation of this research work. It brings many opportunities such
as increased productivity and reduced costs and challenges such as secured data access,
data leakage and amount of control by the organization.
To provision such a framework we need to bridge the gap from both organizations side
and individuals point of view. Mobile device users face issue of application delivery on
multiple platforms. For instance having purchased many applications from one proprietary
application store, individuals may want to move them to a different platform/device but
currently this is not possible. Organizations face security issues in providing such a solution
as there are many potential threats from allowing BYOD work-style such as unauthorized
access to data, attacks from the devices within and outside the network.
ARM based Secure Mobile SDN framework will resolve these issues and enable employees
to consolidate both personal and business calls and mobile data access on a single device.
To address application delivery issue we are introducing KVM based virtualization that
will allow host OS to run multiple guest OS. To address the security problem we introduce
SDN environment where host would be running bridged network of guest OS using Open
vSwitch . This would allow a remote controller to monitor the state of guest OS for making
important control and traffic flow decisions based on the situation.
i
Index terms— BYOD (Bring Your Own Device), ARM, Virtualization, Hyper-
visor, VM(Virtual Machine), SDN (Software Defined Network), Controller, OpenFlow,
GRE(Generic Routing Encapsulation), oVS (OpenFlow Virtual Switch), KVM(Kernel Based
Virtual Machine)
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The mobile network in future would be composed of smart-phones and hand-held de-
vices and it will play big part in defining the working environment in corporations. The new
buzz word Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) has been coined to describe the consumer-
ization of the IT. IT organizations are no longer interested in providing and provisioning
the IT equipment for the individuals. Most of the companies in past had a separate de-
partment for maintaining individual IT equipment so the approach of offloading the task
of hardware / device to the individual can significantly benefit the organizations in terms
of cost cutting, delays in providing IT services due to communication gaps between vari-
ous departments, etc. Technology (2012). The IT organizations can simply provide cash
incentive to individuals to bring their own device for work, and use organization approved
Operating System, device image, secured emulation environment and anti-virus software
when working for company using the device. The second aspect of IT consumerization is
that advent of mobility smart-phones, tablets, blackberry devices means that work doesn’t
stop at 5:30 PM. Also the dramatic growth in computing services and mobility trends e.g.-
3G/4G on smart phones means consumers/ workers want to use their devices on the go as
well as during normal work hours. This would come across both as an opportunity as well
as challenge for the organizations. The opportunity is present in the sense that it would
lead to productivity increase and significant cost reductions. However this also brings forth
a lot of challenges especially from security perspective for organizations. The organizations
have to make sure that the devices are secured from external threats and at the same time
prevent data ex-filtration and unauthorized access to the resources SpA (2012). To explore
this research problem we need a suitable platform which can serve as proof of concept for
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implementation on a large scale. We are selecting the ARM CPU to serve as our base model.
The reason for selecting the ARM platform is performance and ubiquity provided by the
ARM devices. The solution would be a KVM/ARM virtualization solution. The other ben-
efit of using KVM is that its an in built kernel module kvm.ko, so we can keep KVM/ARM
in lines with new kernel releases without the additional maintenance costs. The solution
will have host operating system running KVM environment and unmodified guest OS would
be running in the emulation environment provided by the host OS Dall and Nieh (2010).
Virtualization can in future be extended to provide other features such as high availabil-
ity, load balancing features. The thesis work will make use of Open vSwitch to establish
a networking framework between the host OS and guest OS. This will bring in the scope
of introducing programmability into the network using SDN solution. Programmability in
the network will help us build a flexible OpenFlow based secure mobile SDN framework
for our system. The control plane of SDN will have direct control over the Data Plane
elements Oltsik (2010). This will help deal with issues in traditional networks like devices
from different vendors and two separate devices from same vendors. So individuals can
bring any smart phone/ tablets of their choice as long as they have the virtualization fea-
ture support. The network of emulated virtual machines would be easily managed by the
organization. We plan to establish guest OS using Open vSwitch framework and remotely
host controller such as OpenDayLight in cloud environment. Controller can then commu-
nicate with the ovsdb database of Open vSwitch through SSL or GRE mechanism. We
will compare our solution with other mechanism of introducing security in IT enterprises
and see why this solution will be significantly better than other proposed solutions such
as Prioritized Defense Deployment for BYOD; feedback based strategic sampling security,
application sand-boxing, etc.
1.2 Contribution
The novel aspect of the solution is that using Open vSwitch we can introduce the secure
mobile SDN framework and correspondingly programmability in our network. It will make
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the solution vendor agnostic. So we can virtualize and manage the devices from different
vendors as long as they support virtualization feature. Since ARM CPUs are common in
many smart-phone devices E.g- Samsung Galaxy S5 uses ARM Exynos 5250, the proof
of concept can then easily be deployed in real world scenarios, and tested for performance
and security aspects. Other important contributions of the work are that it will have
significant cost savings, secured environment for managing the VMs and better scalability
as compared to some of the existing BYOD solutions. The result expected of this work is a
base model/prototype serving as experimental platform for mobile networking framework.
The ARM CPU provides Hardware Virtualization Extensions so we make use of KVM
virtualization on base ARM Development board for booting up the host OS and make use
of KVM and emulation software QEMU to bootup the guest OS via call to
KVM_VCPU_RUN ioctl()
in userspace. The ioctl() call handler is present in file arch/arm/kvm/arm.c which issues
HVC(hypercall) instruction. The Open vSwitch feature will be installed on top of Host
system so that we can introduce secure mobile SDN framework on host OS and manage
guest OS.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
The thesis work is organized as follows Chapter 2 describes the related work in the field
such as End User Virtualization, Yocto Project, etc. In Chapter 3 we discuss the System
components, hardware requirements and architecture of our solution. Chapter 4 discusses
the setup of Host and Guest OS, the hardware platform, Open vSwitch and detailed im-
plementation of the solution. Finally we conclude the Thesis discussion in Chapter 5 and
provide details about future work in this field. Appendix section at the end discusses some
roadblocks, errors encountered during the development phase and other potential develop-
ment platforms.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
According to a ESG survey Oltsik (2010) performed on 315 security professionals work-
ing in enterprise organizations about most difficult Mobile Security challenges brought to
light the main concerns are:
• Scope of policy enforcement on devices.
• Data loss in case device is stolen.
• Breach of confidentiality and integrity.
The subsequent sections deals with various approaches to deal with these security chal-
lenges using schemes such as Prioritized Defense Deployment, Virtualization, Mode of Usage
Separation, etc.
2.1 End User Virtualization
The Virtualization technology allows multiple operating systems on a Physical device
to share resources such as memory, I/O devices and storage.
The scope of virtualization is not limited to a particular area. For instance Green
Computing makes use of computing and IT resources efficiently to provide energy efficiency,
and has became an interesting research domain Liangli et al. (2012).
The paper discusses current frameworks and security perspectives in desktop and appli-
cation vitualization. It also highlights many standards adopted by companies such as Cisco
and Citrix following the available technologies.
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There are two main modes which are not necessarily independent of each other:
• Streaming Mode The application and desktop both runs on end user’s device and
are synced with the data center image.
• Hosted Mode Desktop and applications run on data center while image is sent to
end user devices.
The authentication is required by end user in order to access the company resources.
This authentication is provided by a security broker. This process helps standardize and
unify the company wide tools and management process and is used by many leading com-
panies.
OS, user profile and applications are present on separate layers, so user can get any
device anywhere kind of environment and provides fair bit of security via resource isolation
and authentication.
The main flaw in this kind of approach is that no useful dynamics of the network can
be captured on a organization wide basis. Also this framework is not dynamic enough to
deal with security threats. We need a robust framework since dynamics of attack keep on
changing.
Another drawback is that since the individual VMs are compartmentalized, it is not
possible to observe the processes running at hardware and OS levels by a system such as
Network Intrusion Detection System.
2.2 Prioritized Defense Deployment
Prioritized defense deployment discusses a solution intermediary between security pro-
vision and mechanism intrusiveness/cost. It makes use of T-dominance - a distributed algo-
rithm approach to capture the temporal-spatial pattern in enterprise environment. Based
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on this distributed algorithm, strategic sampling is used for malware detection and priori-
tized patching is used as a recovery mechanism. Association logs of smart-phones and their
wireless access points are used to fetch the collocation information.
Smart-phones can be considered as nodes of the graph and their collocation is used to
assign them a reachability value r(u,v), where u and v represent two smart-phones, which
serves as edge weight between the nodes. The structure would be like a weighted undirected
graph.
Figure 2.1: Prioritized Defense Deployment using T-Dominance ’Peng et al. (2013)’
This graph is known as reachability graph G(P) for smart-phones P=u,v,w,.... Filtered
reachability graph GT (P) is derived from this graph with edges having weight less than T.
The smart-phones are divided into two classes agents and non-agent. This decision is
based on the security representation in the network. Agents are given priority over non-
agents for defense mechanism deployment.
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• Strategic sampling like honey-pot. They attract and expose propagating malware.
Agents are chosen based on their security representativeness to get quantifiable secu-
rity provision for malware detection.
• In prioritized patching agents are considered good deliverers of security patches be-
cause of their better connectivity, for instance an important authority in a social
network based graph.
Various mechanism of selecting agents are used. Agents with good reachability are
selected with higher probability for defense deployment compared to randomly selecting a
phone as agent once in a while. Results indicate that strategic sampling and prioritized
defense deployment achieves better performance cost wise compared to patching all smart-
phones deterministically or patching smart-phones using a random selection process Peng
et al. (2013).
While this approach looks reasonable in context of mobile phones, it’s scope doesn’t
cover other devices that can be connected via physical media such as Ethernet cable. Also
it can be complex to manage the data for collocation information and dynamically changing
the structure of graph on addition and removal of devices.
There are no practical implementations of this solution, so there are concerns regarding
the robustness and scalability of this solution.
2.3 MOSES
This paper discusses policy enforcement mechanism on the smart-phones. According
to this paper the OS environment of smart-phones are mostly hard coded and cannot be
configured as per user requirements. Mode of Use SEpeation approach makes use of soft-
virtualization through controlled software isolation Zhauniarovich et al. (2014).
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Some features and advantages of this approach are:
• End user can configure the security profile dynamically according to his/her require-
ment.
• Profile switching can be user driven or automatic
• Security profile is based on the context. The features for the context can be defined
either in terms of low level feature variables e.g-time and location or high level variables
e.g-trust, reputation
Compartments where applications and data are stored are called Secure Profiles. Smart-
phones raw sensors such as GPS, camera and logical sensors can be used to define the context
in terms of boolean variables. If context evaluates to true, profile associated with context
is activated. In case of conflicts, MOSES chooses the SP with highest priority. Application
and data separation occurs at kernel level through file system virtualization approach.
This approach is limited only to Android smart-phones currently.
2.4 KVM/ARM and Virtual Open System
Virtual Open System and Linaro Networking Group have focused their efforts on Virtu-
alization of ARM. KVM/ARM project started as a research project at Columbia University
and is also supported by Virtual Open Systems. Linux kernel 3.9 and beyond provide KVM
support for ARM architecture Dall and Nieh (2013b).
Since ARM CPU have become common in mobile devices, tablets, servers, so there is a
growing demand of utilizing the Virtualization benefits for ARM devices. Split mode CPU
virtualization offered by ARM/KVM solution allows hypervisor to split execution across
CPU modes Dall and Nieh (2014). The architecture introduces three modes - the normal
user mode USR, the kernel mode SVC for running privileged instructions, and a new mode
HYP which is more privileged than SVC mode. There are several changes in terms of OS
architecture, for instance HYP mode only maintains a single page table base register, and
there is no address space split between user mode and kernel mode.
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The kernel is by default booted in HYP mode. This makes the architecture backward
compatible with the legacy systems since kernel always boots in SVC mode in legacy sys-
tems. Pre boot stub known as ”decompresser” decompresses kernel image into memory. On
detecting that it booted in HYP mode, a temporary stub must be installed which would
allow the kernel to fall back to SVC mode and run the decompresser code. This is made
possible using the HYP stub ”arch/arm/kernel/hyp-stub.S”.
Other architectural details of KVM/ARM such as hardware trap, Virtual GIC and
timers have been discussed in the article Dall and Nieh (2013b).
Various development boards have been used as base models by the organization Virtual
Open Systems Systems (2013) such as TI - OMAP 5432 based on ARM v7 architecture,
Samsung Exynos 5250 based on ARM v7, Fast Models based simulation platform, Juno
development board Inc. (2014b) that could serve as good potential solution for KVM/ARM.
The model used as part of thesis is based on the same KVM/ARM architecture. The
fundamental difference is that while this model only plans to boot Virtual Machines on
top of ARM based development boards, we plan to make use of Open vSwitch to create
a bridged network of guest VMs on top of Host VM. This would allow us to implement
network wide policies, firewall rules, load balancing solutions on Guest VMs using a smart
OpenFlow controller such as POX, Floodlight etc.
2.5 Yocto Project
Some other approaches for developing KVM/ARM based solutions were considered to
act as base development models for this thesis project such as Yocto Build system. This
project provides infrastructure for building complete complete Linux OS using package
metadata. It uses OpenEmbedded (OE) build system, tools such as ”bitbake” to develop
Linux images and associated user space applications Project (2014b). It is a layered based
architecture for extension and customization of base system. For instance the base layer is
OpenEmbedded Core (oe-core). There is yocto specific metadata layer on it’s top, followed
by hardware specific Board Support Packages (BSP) and UI specific BSP Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Yocto Project Layered Framework ’Project (2014b)’.
The layers meta-ti Dmytriyenko (2014) and meta-virtualization Project (2014a) have
been developed to provide support for virtualization on TI based development boards. The
paper Papaux et al. (2014) discusses use of Yocto Project to configure valid virtualization
architecture on top of TI-OMAP 5432 and performance analysis of hardware virtualization
extensions.
This looks like a very good approach and I developed meta-ti and meta-virtualization
based Yocto Build for project, but it failed to boot in Hypervisor mode either because of
faulty packages in the build system or improper bootloader. So this can be considered for
future development boards for the project.
2.6 XEN Virtualization on ARM
XEN is a type-1 hypervisor running on top of hardware. Dom0 is the privileged virtual
machine to drive the on board devices. All other virtual machines are of type DomU or
unprivileged VMs. Devices such as SATA and network cards are assigned to Dom0. Unpriv-
ileged VMs make use of the paravirtualized back-ends run by Dom0 to access the device
resources. Shared page memory and ring protocol are used for communication between
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front-end and back-end. Specialized driver domains for running drivers corresponding to a
special class of device are used so that Dom0 doesn’t have to run all the drivers Foundation
(2013).
Figure 2.3: Xen Virtualization over ARM ’Foundation (2013)’.
XEN on ARM eliminated the need for QEMU as there is no emulation feature in XEN
over ARM. It incorporated paravirtualized interfaces for IO. XEN for x86 had two types of
guests: HVM and PV guests. This has been replaced with only one type of guests: PV in
XEN over ARM. The architecture is divided into levels: EL0, EL1, EL2 and HVC is the
instruction used to switch between HYP and Kernel modes Foundation (2013). The solution
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for XEN over ARM solution has been discussed in over ARM (2014) for OMAP5432. This
solution was tried in TI OMAP5432 but the solution is not stable and fails to load the
kernel. Another problem with this solution is that paravirtualized front-ends and back
ends for GPS, Camera etc. don’t exists commercially as of now. The problem arises when
multiple VMs need to access these devices simultaneously. In that scenario we will need to
write PV front end and back-end drivers which is a non-trivial task.
All of the approaches to achieve a secured networking framework for Mobile devices
discussed above have been compared below.
12
Technique Features Advantages Drawbacks
End User vir-
tualization
Multiple systems on
same physical ma-
chine. App can be
running in end user
device or data-center.
Security broker me-
diated authentication.
Clean Separation of
OS and user profile.
Difficult to capture
useful network dy-
namics. Difficult
to observe state
of processes inside
sandboxed VMs.
Prioritized
Defense
Deployment
Used distributed algo-
rithm to capture the
temporal and spatial
characteristics in en-
terprise environment.
Significant cost gains
in terms of threat de-
tection and patching
mechanism.
No practical imple-
mentations suggesting
scalability and robust-
ness.
MOSES Mode of Separation
through controlled
software Isolation.
Make use of policy
enforcement.
Context based security
gives a good view of se-
curity profile. User re-
quirement based pro-
file.
Limited only to An-
droid platform. It
has not been tested on
other platforms.
KVM/ARM
Virtual Open
Systems
Virtualization on
KVM based ARM
platform. Patch to
u-boot for booting
kernel in HYP mode.
Tested on various
platforms, e.g- Exynos
5250, TI OMAP 5432,
Samsung Chrome-
book.
Makes use of a bridged
network, less scope for
programmability.
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Yocto
Project
Provides complete
Linux build infras-
tructure through
package metadata.
Support layers for
virtualization.
Widely supported by
community, Board
support packages to
support variety of
vendors.
Very few practical
deployments, need
to be tested for sta-
ble deployments for
KVM/ARM solution.
XEN Project Type-1 hypervisor,
runs directly on hard-
ware, everything else
runs as VM on top
of XEN. Dom0 is
privileged VM, DomU
is normal user level
VM.
It does not require
an emulation environ-
ment, and as a result is
faster and much more
secured.
Virtualization support
for mobile platform
devices such as GPS,
camera for more than
one VM, require new
paravirtualized font
ends and back ends.
Table 2.1: Comparison of Various Approaches Towards a Mobile Infrastructure
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Chapter 3
SYSTEM DESIGN AND SECURE MOBILE SDN ARCHITECTURE
This chapter introduces the design methodology and approach used for setting up BYOD
framework. In the next chapter experimentation and analysis have been introduced.
3.1 System Use Case Diagram
Figure 3.1: BYOD System Architecture.
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The figure 3.1 shows the use case diagram for the system. As can be seen from the
model, the Mobile User can use personal and company OS, but the company OS would
be monitored by the system administrator for network traffic. Open vSwitch would be
used to provide bridged network for the system. Qemu would be emulating both the guest
Operating Systems. So in case of any new flow entry, the controller would be notified, and
using controller alerts, the admin. can take decision such as allow , deny or redirection of
network traffic.
3.2 System Components
Our research goal is to build a BYOD framework that would allow easy implementa-
tion of corporate policies and data capture for analysis. Two essential components of this
framework are hardware assisted virtualization and Open vSwitch.
3.2.1 Hardware Assisted Virtualization
The base model for experimentation and evaluation are ARMv7 based development
boards, hence we will discuss the hardware assisted virtualization that ARM offered as
part of ARMv7 and ARMv8 releases in this section. The Reduced Instruction Set Com-
puter (RISC) architecture of ARM helps achieve good balance of high performance, small
code size, low power consumption and reduced silicon area ARM (2013). Also many
smart-phones and handheld devices have ARM based processors-with multiple cores. ARM
architecture virtualization extensions and Large Physical Address Extension(LPAE) enable
efficient implementation of Virtual Machine hypervisors for ARM architecture compliant
processors.
16
Figure 3.2: ARMv7 Security Extensions .
17
Another important feature that ARMv7 and ARMv8 based processors offer is Trust-
Zone(Security Extensions) 3.2 apart from new CPU mode HYP mode discussed in KVM/ARM
section in previous chapter. TrustZone splits the mode into two worlds - secure and non-
secure. A special mode - monitor mode is used to switch between secure and non-secure
worlds. Although secure mode doesn’t work in HYP mode, since trap and emulate sup-
port is not present, still we can run sensitive applications in secure world. The paper
KVM/ARM:The design and implementation of Linux ARM Hypervisor Dall and Nieh
(2014) discusses secure world and other details about CPU, Memory, Timer and Interrupt
Virtualization of ARM.
The KVM ARM architecture achieves comparable and in some cases better performance
than traditional KVM x86 based devices. There have been some significant changes in ARM
architecture. The table compares some key features of ARM and x86 architectures.
ARM introduces split mode virtualization feature. The virtualization support is pro-
vides by the Hyp mode and the kernel mode runs core Linux kernel services without any
intrusive code modifications. The hypervisor is split into two components to provide this
functionality, namely: highvisor and lowvisor.
Lowvisor deals with setting up of execution context, isolation between contexts, context
switches between host and guest execution modes. Lowvisor also deals with interrupts
and exceptions that trap to hypervisor. Highvisor on the other hand scheduling, locking
mechanism and memory allocation functions. Stage-2 page fault handling from the VM and
instruction emulation are also handled by the highvisor Dall and Nieh (2013a).
Whenever there is requirement of switch between the hypervisor and VM, the process
involves mode transitions. If the user is running the VM and a trap to the hypervisor mode
is required, VM will trap to lowvisor running in Hyp mode, followed by lowvisor trapping
to highvisor mode. On the other hand if we need to switch from hypervisor to VM mode,
first a trap to Hyp mode occurs and then switch to the VM takes place.
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Feature x86 Architecture ARM Architecture
Modes of Op-
eration
It has root and non root
modes orthogonal to CPU
protection modes. Trap and
emulate from root to non root
is possible.
Hyp mode is separate and
more privileged than user and
kernel mode.
Privilege
Mode
Root mode has full support
for kernel and user mode func-
tionality.
ARM Hyp mode has its own
set of features that provide
much more complex options.
Save/Restore
Operations
Hardware support for VM
control block and auto
save/restore for switching
to and from root mode is
available.
ARM provides no hardware
support and any save or re-
store state feature needs to be
implemented in software.
Table 3.1: Comparison of x86 and ARM Architecture
3.2.2 Open vSwitch and its Comparison with other Switching Techniques
Linux provides three kinds of software switches:
• bridge It has key components FDB(Forwarding Database), STP(Spanning Tree), etc.
It uses promiscuous mode to receive all packets Makita (2014). Many common NIC
filters make use of unicast without promiscuous mode if destination is not it’s MAC
address.
• macvlan Four types of modes are : private, vepa, bridge, passthru. It uses unicast
filtering if supported instead of passthru.
• Open vSwitch It is switching technique that supports OpenFlow. It can be used
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Figure 3.3: ARM System Architecture. ’Dall and Nieh (2013a)’
Figure 3.4: Switching Using Bridge ’Makita (2014)’.
as normal switch and also has many features such as GRE, VXLAN. It provides
forwarding based on Flow. User space has control plane and data plane is present in
kernel space. It there is a flow miss-hit, upcall to userspace daemon is made.
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Figure 3.5: Switching Using Mac VLAN ’Makita (2014)’.
Considering the use of OpenFlow for our solution and need of a centralized controller in the
architecture which cannot be achieved without Open vSwitch, we are making use of Open
vSwitch to construct the underlying network.
Virtual switches connect the interfaces of Virtual Machines and establish connection
to outer network with help of Physical Network Interface Card (pNIC). Open vSwitch is
used extensively in OpenStack and OpenNebula. We can explore broad range of Open-
Flow features via software switches, that cannot be provided by hardware switches. Two
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Figure 3.6: Switching Using Open vSwitch ’Makita (2014)’.
important parts of OvS are ovs-vswitchd daemon that controls switch and is responsible
for implementing OpenFlow protocol, and datapath kernel module to implement the packet
forwarding Emmerich et al. (2014).
The performance comparison of various forwarding techniques as shown in table 3.2
with single CPU core per VM and switch discussed in paper Emmerich et al. (2014) suggests
that Open vSwitch proves to be fastest Linux kernel packet forwarding application.
Application pNIC-
pNIC[Mbps]
pNIC-
vNIC[Mbps]
pNIC-vNIC-
pNIC[Mbps]
pNIC-vNIC-
vNIC[Mbps]
Open vSwitch 1.88 0.85 0.3 0.27
IP Forwarding 1.58 0.78 0.19 0.16
Linux bridge 1.11 0.74 0.2 0.19
DPDK vSwitch 11.31 - 10.5* 6.5*
Table 3.2: Open vSwitch Performance Analysis
Also rule based system used by Open vSwitch would make it easier to configure a
generic OpenFlow controller for VMs connected to Open vSwitch and implement access
control based on the flows.
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For instance blocking packets from a compromised VM or redirecting packets to a dif-
ferent destination. The Software Defined Network model thus formed can be made more
scalable by configuring a controller that is logically centralized but physically distributed,
e.g.- HyperFlow Tootoonchian and Ganjali (2010). Open vSwitch across two host systems
can also communicate via a Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnel which would be
discussed as part of future work for this project and is beyond scope of Thesis work.
3.3 System Architecture
The system architecture for BYOD framework uses Samsung Exynos 5250 as base plat-
form. The board was first introduced in 2012 and features two Cortex-A15 cores clocked at
1.7 GHz InSignal (2013b). It offers 50 percent higher per MHz performance compared to
commonly used Cortex A9 architecture. It is lightweight (150g) and is common in many
handheld devices such as Google Nexus Tablet. It is also very cost effective ($150). So
the goal of project is to develop the framework on this platform so it can later be used for
deployment in a bigger testing environment or code base from this platform to be deployed
on other tablets or mobile devices compatible with ARM architecture.
The architecture consists of three basic features:
• As shown in the Figure 3.7 below the Host OS should have hardware assisted virtu-
alization enabled and should boot in HYP mode enabled. We are choosing Ubuntu
Precise (12.04) as the Host operating system. The host operating system will need a
device tree blob exynos5250-arndale.dtb which contains description of hardware. It
is specific to the development board. Another component required is the kernel itself
uImage. Details of generating both will be discussed in next chapter.
• Open vSwitch should run on top of Host Platform. This would allow us to make use
of OpenFlow APIs along with other advantages of Open vSwitch as discussed briefly
under Open vSwitch subsection.
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Figure 3.7: System Design Using Open vSwitch.
An important consideration for this project is compatibility of Open vSwitch with the
Linux Kernel. The 3.3 shows the compatibility of Linux Kernel with Open vSwitch
versions. Therefore we are choosing Linux Kernel 3.14.32 and Open vSwith version
openvswitch-2.3.1.
Open vSwitch Compatible Linux Kernel
1.4.x 2.6.18 to 3.2
1.5.x 2.6.18 to 3.2
1.6.x 2.6.18 to 3.2
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1.7.x 2.6.18 to 3.3
1.8.x 2.6.18 to 3.4
1.9.x 2.6.18 to 3.8
1.10.x 2.6.18 to 3.8
1.11.x 2.6.18 to 3.8
2.0.x 2.6.18 to 3.10
2.1.x 2.6.18 to 3.11
2.3.x 2.6.18 to 3.14
Table 3.3: Open vSwitch and Compatible Linux Kernel
• The guest operating system should boot using the bridged network provided by Open
vSwitch. Additionally the guest operating system requires the kernel image to boot
guest OS zImage, the DTB file, file system image to boot guest, a modified version of
qemu to emulate and drive KVM from userspace.
3.3.1 Hardware Requirements and Features
Samsung Exynos 5250 uses ARM v7 Cortex A15 CPU. Some important features of the
hardware platform are:
• Advanced Single Instruction Multiple Data version2 (SIMD v2).
• High performance single or double precision Floating Point Unit (FPU).
• Security Extensions for enhanced security.
• Virtualized Interrupts with Multicore ARM Trust Zone architecture.
• Multiprocessing facility through multiprocessing extensions.
• Virtualization extensions for developing virtualized systems.
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Figure 3.8: Arndale Development Board.
• Ability to reach 1.7 GHz processing capability to meet requirements for performance
optimized consumer applications.
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Other requirements for setting up the test environment include:
• System to prepare the host, guest images, qemu. A system with sufficient disk space
and Ubuntu-12.04 is suggested.
• Samsung Exynos 5250 Arndale Board 3.8.
• A memory card (16 Gb suggested) to load host and guest OS.
• A serial port cable to communicate with board using Minicom.
• Power supply (5V).
• LAN cable connected to the Arndale development board.
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Chapter 4
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this chapter we will discuss the system setup and user experiments for our BYOD frame-
work. ARM processor is present in many tablets such as Samsung Chromebook, Nexus 9,
etc. Windows is also talking about Windows over ARM. It’s been said Windows over ARM
could kill desktops World (2014). All these reasons support our choice of base development
platform. The steps for this part are similar to Virtual Open System guide for KVM over
Arndale Systems (2013) and tutorial from Linaro Linux group Lim (2013). The contri-
bution in this section is mainly building a Open vSwitch compatible kernel and booting up
pre built guest OS using Open vSwitch on top of host OS as shown in figure 4.1.
The overall system activity includes booting up of Linux kernel in Hyp mode, start of
Open vSwitch on top of Host Linux Kernel and then starting the guest kernel on top of
bridged network created by Open vSwitch.
4.1 Host and Guest Setup
We are using Ubuntu 12.04 LTS as base system to setup Linux Kernel and rootfs for
both host and guest OS. We will first install the following packages on host system:
• Qemu: a generic opensource machine Emulator Systems (2013).
• debootstrap: a tool which installs base system into subdirectory of another already.
installed system.
• An ARM Cross Compiler for cross compiling the packages.
$ sudo apt-get install -y gcc-arm-linux-gnueabihf
$ sudo apt-get install -y qemu qemu-user qemu-user-static
$ sudo apt-get install -y debootstrap
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Figure 4.1: System Activity Diagram.
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4.1.1 Host File System and Kernel Setup
We will install arm-precise-root using qemu-debootstrap and setup root password for
arm-precise-root Lim (2013).
$ sudo qemu-debootstrap --arch=armhf raring ./arm-precise-root
$ sudo chroot ./arm-precise-root
Next copy the file etc/init/tty1.conf to ttySAC2.conf and change tty1 to ttySAC2.conf.
Also perform same steps to create a file ttyAMA0.conf in same directory. You will also need
to change the baud rate to 115200 for serial port login. Also we need to add a line ttySAC2
to file etc/securetty.
Add the following lines to etc/source.list
deb http://ports.ubuntu.com/ precise main restricted universe
deb-src http://ports.ubuntu.com/ precise main restricted universe
Update the sources.list file, reconfigure locales and install the following packages and
exit from host rootfs
$ locale-gen en_US.UTF-8
$ dpkg-reconfigure locales
$ apt-get install -y ssh gcc make xorg fluxbox tightvncserver
$ apt-get install -y libsdl-dev libfdt-dev bridge-utils uml-utilities
$ apt-get clean
$ exit
Now we need to setup kernel for the Host OS. For this part we need to download linux-
linaro-lng version 3.14.32 and unzip it to act as source tree. We will use it to generate dtb
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and uImage for the host file system. Run the commands below on your Linux machine. We
need to download sources from tar.gz repository. If we download from git repository, we
will get errors while installing the Linux Kernel modules on arndale development board.
$ wget https://releases.linaro.org/14.06/components
/kernel/linux-linaro-lng/linux-linaro-lng-3.14.3-2014.06.tar.bz2
$ tar -zxvf linux-linaro-lng-3.14.3-2014.06.tar.bz2
$ cd linux-linaro-lng
$ export CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabihf-
$ export ARCH=arm
$ mkdir ../lll-kvmhost ./scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh
-O ../lll-kvmhost/ linaro/configs/linaro-base.conf
linaro/configs/distribution.conf linaro/configs/kvm-host.conf
linaro/configs/arndale.conf linaro/configs/ovs.conf
$ make O=../lll-kvmhost/ uImage dtbs modules
$ cp -t /tftpboot/ ../lll-kvmhost/arch/arm/boot/uImage
../lll-kvmhost/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-arndale.dtb
$ sudo make ARCH=arm CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabihf-
O=../lll-kvmhost/ INSTALL_MOD_PATH=${KVMHOST_ROOT} modules_install
This will generate uImage in the folder lll-kvmhost/arch/arm/boot and exynos5250-
arndale.dtb in lll-kvmhost/arch/arm/boot/dtc
These two files would be used later.
31
4.1.2 Guest FileSystem and Kernel Setup
Guest file system that will be used as VM on top of host file system can be downloaded
from Virtual Open System. We are using Versatile Express - an ARM release as guest
kernel. For this we can download guest-zImage and guest-vexpress.dtb from the website
Systems (2013). We will then need to create a bootable guest OS image and copy the
precise file system used for host OS in that image. Following steps are sed for this
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=./ubuntu.img bs=1MiB count=512
$ mkfs.ext3 ./ubuntu.img
$ sudo mount -o loop ubuntu.img mnt/
$ sudo cp -a precise/* mnt/
$ sudo umount mnt/
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4.1.3 Bootloader for ARM
Figure 4.2: Linux Arm Bootloading Process.
The following steps are followed by ARM bootloader traditionally to boot in host mode:
• The kernel finds and stores all the RAM needed by it for volatile data storage.
• The option console=”” is used by bootloader to enable one serial port on the target.
• MACH_TYPE_xxx
value is provided by bootloader to the kernel through register r1. The file linux/arch/a4rm/tools/mach-
types stores these values.
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• Register r2 is used to pass physical address of boot data to kernel. The bootloader
must also create and initialize kernel tagged list or device tree . The tag-list must be
placed it in region of memory where it cannot be overwritten. If dtb option is used
instead of tag list, it should be put in RAM at assigned address, and initialized with
boot data.
• If initramfs is used, it should be placed in memory region where it cannot be over-
written.
• Finally the kernel can be called via zImage from the flash or RAM location.
To boot the ARM kernel in HYP mode directly the bootloader has been modified. The
bootloader used for booting up the Host file system in Hypervisor mode and two additional
files can also be downloaded directly from Virtual Open System Systems (2013).
u-boot.bin
arndale-bl1.bin
smdk5250-spl.bin
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4.1.4 Qemu for ARM Setup
On the x86 Laptop/PC run the commands below:
sudo apt-get install -y pkg-config-arm-linux-gnueabihf
cat | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/armhf-raring.list <<END
deb [arch=armhf] http://ports.ubuntu.com/ubuntu-ports precise main
restricted universe multiverse
deb-src [arch=armhf] http://ports.ubuntu.com/ubuntu-ports precise
main restricted universe multiverse
END
sudo xapt -a armhf -m -b zlib1g-dev libglib2.0-dev libfdt-dev
libpixman-1-dev
sudo dpkg -i /var/lib/xapt/output/*.deb
git clone git://git.qemu.org/qemu.git
cd qemu
git checkout -b v1.6.0 v1.6.0
git submodule update --init dtc
mkdir build; cd build
../configure --cross-prefix=arm-linux-gnueabihf- --target-list=arm-softmmu
--enable-kvm --audio-drv-list="" --enable-fdt --static
make
This will generate qemu that would be used to emulate the ARM guest OS on top of
Host OS using the Open vSwitch bridge.
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4.2 Booting Up Arndale Board
We will be using SD card (16 Gb suggested) as a bootup medium to run Host OS
Ubuntu-12.04 on top of Arndale board. Use a SD card reader and plug it into Laptop or
desktop for copying file system.
Copy bl1, spl and u-boot to the SD card. The SD card will be present as a storage
device on PC and can be viewed by command ”fdisk -l”. In my case it is /dev/sdb.
$ sudo dd if=arndale-bl1.bin of=/dev/sdb bs=512 seek=1
$ sudo dd if=smdk5250-spl.bin of=/dev/sdb bs=512 seek=17
$ sudo dd if=u-boot.bin of=/dev/sdb bs=512 seek=49
Now we will copy host kernel and dtb file. These values will depend upon the size of
device tree and the Linux kernel. For instance my Linux Kernel size was (4.6 Mb) so I have
copied dtb after sufficient space so it doesn’t overlap with address space of kernel (uImage).
$ sudo dd if=uImage of=/dev/sdb bs=512 seek=1105
$ sudo dd if=arndale.dtb of=/dev/sdb bs=512 seek=13393
Now format the SD card and copy precise file system, and source tree onto the SD card.
Remember to format from start block address after dtb file, so leave sufficient space.
$ sudo fdisk /dev/sdX
$ n
$ p
$ 1
$ 16384
$
$ w
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$ mkdir mnt
$ sudo mkfs.ext3 /dev/sdb1
$ sudo mount /dev/sdb1 mnt
$ sudo cp -a ./arm-precise-root/* mnt/
$ sudo umount /dev/sdb1
Now we need to copy the Guest file system, guest device tree, guest Kernel and qemu
generated for ARM to SD Card. So simply copy these files to root folder of the SD card.
Alternatively you can use scp to copy these files once the board boots up and gets an IP
Address via DHCP.
Next step would be to insert SD card into the appropriate slot on the board and boot
it up.
Follow the steps below to boot up the board:
• Connect the serial port cable provided with Arndale board to USB port of your
PC/Laptop.
• Download and install minicom or a similar application on your PC.
• Check the DIP switch settings on Arndale board. It should be 001000 from left to
right.
• Press the bootup key present on Arndale board. This link InSignal (2013a) is a more
detailed version of booting up Arndale board.
• As soon as board starts loading kernel and reads device tree properly, press escape key
and enter commands below to configure boot arguments and environment variables.
These commands will vary depending upon location of your kernel and device tree.
$ env edit bootargs
$ root=/dev/mmcblk1p1 rw rootwait earlyprintk
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console=ttySAC2,115200n8 --no-log
$ env edit bootcmd\
$ mmc read 40007000 451 3000;mmc read 42000000
3451 100;bootm 40007000 - 42000000
$ env save
$ boot
If the configuration is correct, board would bootup in HYP mode as can be seen in the
figure 4.3 below.
Figure 4.3: Host OS Booting in Hyp Mode.
Once this is done board would boot up successfully. Enter username and password to
login on the board as root user. Once the system boots up and gets the IP address, run the
following command in root mode. The board has a time skew and this command syncs it
with online ntpserver.
$ ntpdate -s time.nist.gov
4.3 Open vSwitch with KVM
This section deals with installation and configuration of Open vSwitch on Arndale board,
and running KVM on top of Open vSwitch. First check kvm driver has been successfully
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installed with command
$ ls /dev/kvm
The installation of openvswitch daemon depends upon the modules : stp.ko, llc.ko
bridge.ko and vxlan.ko, so before configuring Open vSwitch make sure these modules have
been installed properly. You can use the command ”lsmod modulename” to check if a
module is present or absent.
Next we need to build Open vSwitch. It would require linux-headers or source tree to
build openvswitch.ko module. For this we can copy sources from linux-linaro-lng-3.14.32 into
the directory /lib/modules/3.14.32/build so that Open vSwitch is able to find dependent
modules for it’s build. The version for Open vSwitch used for build is openvswitch-2.3.10
as it is compatible with Linux kernel 3.14.32.
Steps below are followed in order after this:
$ apt-get update
$ apt-get install -y git automake autoconf gcc uml-utilities
libtool build-essential git
$ wget http://openvswitch.org/releases/openvswitch-1.10.0.tar.gz
$ tar zxvf openvswitch-2.3.10.tar.gz
$ cd openvswitch-2.3.10
$ ./boot.sh
$ ./configure --with-linux=/lib/modules/‘uname -r‘/build
$ make && make install
$ insmod datapath/linux/openvswitch.ko
$ mkdir -p /usr/local/etc/openvswitch
$ ovsdb-tool create /usr/local/etc/openvswitch/conf.db
vswitchd/vswitch.ovsschema
$ ovsdb-server -v --remote=punix:/usr/local/var/run/openvswitch/db.sock \
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--remote=db:Open_vSwitch,manager_options \
--private-key=db:SSL,private_key \
--certificate=db:SSL,certificate \
--pidfile --detach --log-file
$ ovs-vsctl --no-wait init
$ ovs-vswitchd --pidfile --detach
$ ovs-vsctl show
The figure 4.4 below show the expected outcome after correct configuration of Open
vSwitch.
Figure 4.4: Open vSwitch Configuration.
Now we need to create custom versions of qemu-ifup and qemu-ifdown scripts that would
be used in KVM configuration of guest OS. The custom versions will make use of Open
vSwitch bridges vSwitch (2013). The configuration files /etc/ovs-ifup and /etc/ovs-ifdown
should be created for this purpose.
$ vim /etc/ovs-ifup
#!/bin/sh
switch=’br0’
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/sbin/ifconfig $1 0.0.0.0 up
ovs-vsctl add-port ${switch} $1
$ vim /etc/ovs-ifdown
#!/bin/sh
switch=’br0’
/sbin/ifconfig $1 0.0.0.0 down
ovs-vsctl del-port ${switch} $1
After this we need to add a bridge using Open vSwitch and add a port to the bridge over
which the guests can communicate. Steps for establishing this connection and configuring
IP address for the bridge and gateway are as follows
ovs-vsctl add-br br0
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 eth0
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 tap0
ovs-vsctl list port
#ifconfig eth0 0
ifconfig eth0 0.0.0.0 up
ifconfig tap0 0.0.0.0 up
ifconfig br0 10.218.108.16 netmask 255.255.248.0
route add default gw 10.218.104.1 br0
The command below can be used to verify the correct configuration for Open vSwitch.
The final task for bringing up the guest Operating system requires that guest image
ubuntu.img, guest device tree guest-vexpress.dtb and guest kernel guest-zImage are already
41
Figure 4.5: Open vSwitch Interface Display.
present on the SD card. We will issue the command to qemu to bootup the guest OS on
top of Open vSwitch
Figure 4.6: Qemu Guest Bootup on Host Linux OS.
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./qemu-system-arm \
-enable-kvm -kernel guest-zImage \
-nographic -dtb ./guest-vexpress.dtb \
-m 512 -M vexpress-a15 -cpu cortex-a15 \
-netdev type=tap,id=net0,script=no,downscript=no,ifname="tap0" \
-device virtio-net,transport=virtio-mmio.1,netdev=net0 \
-device virtio-blk,drive=virtio-blk,transport=virtio-mmio.0 \
-drive file=./ubuntu.img,id=virtio-blk,if=none \
-append "earlyprintk console=ttyAMA0 mem=512M
root=/dev/vda rw ip=dhcp --no-log
virtio_mmio.device=1M@0x4e000000:74:0
virtio_mmio.device=1M@0x4e100000:75:1"
The guest OS will bootup and get IP address via DHCP, as can be seen 4.7
Figure 4.7: Guest OS Bootup Using Open vSwitch.
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Finally the guest OS terminal will be visible and can be used for communication with
other hosts or guest OS 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Ubuntu Guest OS Terminal .
During the development phase some files and sources were used directly as provided by
various open source development groups and some file/scripts were written from scratch.
List of all the modules used is as below:
File Name or Source Purpose Used/New
linaro-linux-lng-3.14.32 Sources for kernel Used from Linaro Group
arm-precise-root File system For Host OS Generated
/etc/init/ttySAC2.conf Serial Port Communication Modified
/etc/securetty Serial Port Communication Modified
/guest Folder for Guest OS New
/etc/exports x86 Host VNC communica-
tion
Modified
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kconfig/merge config.sh Script for Host Kernel
Setup
Linaro Group
linaro/configs/linaro-
base.conf
Script for Host Kernel
Setup
Generated
linaro/configs/kvm-
host.conf
Script for Host Kernel
Setup
Generated
linaro/configs/arndale.conf Script for Host Kernel
Setup
Generated
boot/dts/exynos5250-
arndale.dtb
Host OS Device Tree New
arch/arm/boot/uImage Host Kernel New
stp.ko, llc.ko, bridge.ko,
vxlan.ko, gre.ko
Host Kernel Modules for
Open vSwitch
Generated
u-boot.bin Host Bootloader Used from Virtual Open
Systems
arndale-bl1.bin Host Bootloader Used from Virtual Open
Systems
smdk5250-spl.bin Host Bootloader Used from Virtual Open
Systems
qemu-system-arm Guest Emulator Generated
bootargs Command to boot host New
bootcmd Command to boot host New
openvswitch-2.3.10 Open vSwitch File System Used from Open vSwitch
/etc/qemu-ifup File to bring up qemu on
Open vSwitch
New
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/etc/qemu-ifdown File to bring down qemu on
Open vSwitch
New
ovs script.sh Open vSwitch bootup and
ovsdb setup script
New
ovs setup.sh Open vSwitch network
setup script
New
qemu-bootovs.sh Open vSwitch Qemu Guest
boot script
New
Table 4.1: List of Files Used in Development Phase
4.4 Current Work: SDN and Communication with Remote OpenDayLight Controller
SDN came into being from the need of simplifying network management and control.
It has two main components, the Control Plane defines how to handle the traffic. The
second element is Data Plane, which handles traffic flow based on flow entries defined by
control plane. A well defined API known as OpenFlow is used by SDN to install the rules
of traffic flow. OpenFlow switch such as Open vSwitch can have multiple packet handling
rule tables. This provides openFlow the flexibility to behave as Firewall, switch, Network
Address Translator (NAT). As discussed in the paper Feamster et al. (2013) discusses the
need of data plane and control plane separation to provide better traffic engineering in
terms of predictability, reliability, network management functions.
The goals we wish to target is enforcement of security policy separately for each part of
network , for instance we may want to allow limited access to finance department servers so
we can enforce security policy and isolate resources in that particular department by VLAN
tagging and specific traffic flow rules for that particular VLAN as can be seen in figure 4.9.
Second advantage is that if we have abnormal traffic behavior within the network/VLAN,
the controller can flag the event as Intrusion based on rules specified and quarantine a
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Figure 4.9: SDN Based Programmable Openflow Network.
particular VM. In context of heterogeneous mobile devices in a BYOD environment, this
would be very useful, e.g- two people from same department one having Mac Air and another
having Samsung Galaxy Tab can run company provided guest OS on the fly. The controller
would Group them in same VLAN according to the deviceID tagging, MAC associated with
a devices, etc. So policies and access rules for that particular VLAN will apply to these two
tablets. The Guest OS images can be synced with secured datacenter images at a remote
location.
Although performance is not out main focus, but this kind of network scenario will
offer load balancing features too. So if a particular server is overwhelmed with traffic the
controller can dynamically spawn another VM, server image and provide new traffic flow to
distribute load over both the machines.
We can use a remote controller for managing and monitoring the network traffic flow,
and achieve the functionality of a SDN network. The controller used is OpenDayLight. The
modular approach provided by OpenDayLight project helps provide SDN functionality and
achieve solid platform for other important features such as NFV(Near Field Virtualization).
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Figure 4.10: Remote SDN Controller Communication with OvS.
The Northbound APIs of the OpenDaylight controller can be used for providing the
application development functionality through an abstraction layer. The southbound API
will connect to the Open vSwitch present on Samsung Exynos 5250. Another good feature is
that it also has plugins for Inter Controller communication, so we can achieve a distributed
architecture as discussed in hyperflow Tootoonchian and Ganjali (2010). The controller
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would prove very useful for managing the Virtual Machines in a BYOD scenario. In case
of network events such as DoS attacks targeting a particular Mobile device the controller
can have an Intrusion detection mechanism configured that looks for application protocol
conformation violations or DoS attack patterns.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
There are various models of providing a secured framework for mobile devices, but we
need a generic solution that transcends all limitations such as scalability, platform compat-
ibility, security, etc. Mobile devices such as smart-phones and tablets will certainly play a
role in future work setting of each organization. BYOD using a SDN framework can prove
very efficient, scalable and secured solution for organizations in future.
The cost of implementing this framework would be significantly less than the existing
infrastructure cost for providing and maintaining IT equipment to the employees. ARM
being present in many target devices and new features such as Virtualization, Security
Extensions, better throughput than it’s peers serve as a suitable experimentation model.
We analyzed drawbacks of other solutions present and KVM over ARM using Open vSwitch
looks better compared to other solutions such as End User Virtualization, XEN, etc.
The model in this Thesis research work ARMv7 serves as a proof of concept that ARM
is a cheap, fast and stable platform for serving as a base models for such devices. In the
future work section we also discuss how the ARMv7 solution can easily be ported to ARMv8
development platforms which have better performance and larger address range but are not
yet commercially available. Samsung is already using ARM and windows is also planning
to use ARM as processor in their coming tablets and mobile devices. It is thus a novel
idea to provide a solution/architecture which can make use of these capabilities provided
by ARM and serve as a model of defining corporate network comprising of mobile devices
in future. While there are many issues still to be resolved such as Controller coordination
with Open vSwitch for ARM, use of VMI for finer system analysis, this research work is
still a significant step towards realization of BYOD goal.
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5.2 Scope for Future
ARM v7 is a good prospective platform for BYOD implementation. The future work
for the project includes the deployment of ARM based BYOD platform in a testing envi-
ronment. We have been working on a Mobile testbed consisting of 4 Unmanned Ground
Vehicles(UGVs) and 6 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). This board being lightweight
can be a suitable candidate to be deployed on UAVs.
The Robotic control functionality for UGVs would be provided by Arduino Uno De-
velopment board Uno (2011), which is standard for common robotic projects and UAVs
would make use of Ardu Pilot Board DroneCode (2014) with compatible camera. Since
Arduino platforms do not come with sufficient computing capability and the signal and net-
work traffic analysis for testbed would require a platform with good computing capability
so we Samsung Exynos 5250 can be integrated with Ardu Pilot for providing computing
capability.
The Juno Development board would be considered as a platform for UGVs. Since the
Juno development board has ARMv8 which comes with full scale native virtualization, and
with bigger address space range. Furthermore any application developed for the platform
ARMv7 can easily be ported to ARMv8 Inc. (2014c).
Another feature that would be incorporated to the system architecture is the Virtual
Machine Introspection(VMI) capability. VMI capability would allow monitoring of guest
OS internal state, state transitions(events) and I/O activity. As an administrator this would
provide better visibility of state of VM and enforce security policies. A VMI based Intrusion
Detection System can be deployed in the network which will observe the hardware state and
events of a guest. Being isolated from host it would provide high degree of attack resistance
even if host is corrupted.
The technique for incorporating VMI capability is an active area of research currently
and one of the models we can consider is LibVMI LibVMI (2013). The qemu emulator
would need to be patched like:
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Figure 5.1: Comparison Between ARMv7 and ARMv8.
<domain type=’kvm’ xmlns:qemu=’http://libvirt.org/schemas/domain/qemu/1.0’>
This is a very fast way to access the memory but it is also considered buggy and may
crash the VM LibVMI (2013). So coming up with a good way of providing VMI capability
in SDN context can be a useful research area which will be explored further in near future.
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5.2.1 Surrogate as Service: vmBox Security
Another prospective scope for future is to use ARM development board for security
in Mobile Vehicular Environment. The collaboration between Autonomous Vehicle in real
time will put each device in a high risk position. The adversary can target open security
vulnerability. For instance the speed control of vehicle can be manipulated by exploiting
OS level vulnerability since the code/computing from a Vehicle in platoon is offloaded to
Surrogate containers , if the Vehicle is compromised.
Other methods of attack such as hack attacks and shack attacks have been discussed in
detail in Inc. (2013). We propose a security verification approach on each host device.
At hardware level, ARM TrustZone(Security Extension) will provide split mode feature
of secure and non-secure environments. This will allow boot time verification of trusted
components and runtime hypervisor protection LENGYEL et al. (2014). Execution of
code on virtual CPUs is strictly managed by Configuration Register.
The core mode called monitor mode will allow context switch between two virtual pro-
cessors running in time sliced fashion depending upon the offloaded code from Vehicle.
Once the request reaches the monitor mode on surrogate, trusted software would route the
request accordingly as can be seen in 5.2.
For instance if normal computing is required by Vehicle - IRQ (normal interrupt request)
, this will be handled by Normal World on surrogate as shown in figure. The remote user will
have privileges of read/write in this mode. However if operation requires access to secure
world resources monitor mode would switch to Secure world, and remote user/adversary
will have lower read privileges only. This will prevent adversary in platoon from mask-
ing secure world interrupts FIQ(Fast Interrupt Requests) modifying Status Registers e.g.
CPSR(Current Program Status Register) Wu et al. (2015).
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Figure 5.2: Security Vulnerability on a Surrogate Device .
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APPENDIX A
DEVELOPMENT PHASE ERROR LOG
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In this section we will discuss the Challenges Faced during the development and some of
the techniques employed to resolve these challenges so that future build process can make
use of this development experience for a smooth build.
• Some of the gcc libraries are dependent upon python libraries so all the python de-
pendencies for the development environment need to be installed for gcc to build up
properly A.1.
apt-get install python-dev
Figure A.1: Gcc Failure During Build.
• Openssh Errors during the build of Open vSwitch was another issue A.2. We need to
make sure this package is present and it’s version is compatible with Open vSwitch.
• Libvirt Daemon needs the firewall modules to be enabled during kernel build. We
need to go to
\lib\modules\uname -a\build
and enable the corresponding firewall modules as external modules that are one de-
pendencies of libvirt daemon.
• Modules bc needs to be present for kernel build.
• Kernel boot parameters need to be proper to avoid A.4, the device tree start address
should not overlap with address range of uImage.
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Figure A.2: Open vSwitch Build Failure.
Figure A.3: Libvirtd Build Issue.
• Modules stp.ko, llc.ko, bridge.ko and vxlan.ko need to be present for openvswitch.ko
module to be installed. Also the device source tree and kernel should be compatible.
• Make sure that qemu parameters for bootup are in accordance with the parameters
give in script in implementation Chapter. Otherwise the kernel may crash and build
would have to be started anew A.5.
60
Figure A.4: Kernel Boot Error.
Figure A.5: Kernel Panic Due to Improper Qemu Parameters.
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APPENDIX B
OTHER POTENTIAL PLATFORMS FOR DEVELOPMENT
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• OMAP 5432 sVirt feature of protecting the KVM ARM guests has been discussed
on TI-OMAP 5432. This can be another suitable platform for testing SDN solution
in ARM virtualized environment since it offers additional security provided by libvirt.
A stable bootloader and way to boot Ubuntu or Fedora on this board needs to be
explored.
Figure B.1: TI Omap 5432 Development Board ’Systems. (2013)’
• TI OMAP 5432 XEN SOLUTION A stable bootloader and kernel is required,
solution discussed for TI-5432 doesn’t work currently.
• ARM Fast Models Versatile Express simulation platform is a good model that can
be tried for eperimentation.
• ARM Juno It comes with ARMv8 and it is a 64-bit CPU. Currently price of this
board is 4200$and if license for Developer Studio is included, it costs 700$almost
35x price of arndale Exynos5250.
• Samsung Chromebook Although it is ARMv8 CPU, many developers face known
issues in Virtualization over this platform.
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Figure B.2: Arm Juno Development Board ’Inc. (2014a)’
• Nexus 9 A good, and powerful model providing ARMv8, has to be explored further.
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Figure B.3: Samsung Chromebook with 64 Bit ARMv8 ’Samsung (2013)’
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Figure B.4: Google Nexus 9 with 64 Bit ARMv8 ’Nexus9 (2014)’
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